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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NELLIE ALEXANDRA HANSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 89-0249 CA 
Priority No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that a child 
suing on her own behalf must first plead and prove that there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances before stating 
a cause of action to modify a paternity or divorce decree? 
2. was the court order approving the stipulation 
which inter alia relieved respondent of his obligation to 
support the child void for lack of jurisdiction? 
3. Did the trial court discriminate against Nellie 
Alexandra Hansen because she was illegitimate? 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. On October 2, 1986, Carl Stuart Fauvet filed a 
Petition for Determination of Paternity in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah. (R.l) 
2. Previous to the filing of the petition Patti Jill 
Hansen, the child's mother entered into a Stipulation whereby 
the mother with assistance from her family agreed to assume 
full custodial responsibility for the minor child and 
defendant would waive his parental rights and responsibilities 
and consent to termination of his parental rights. (R.5-7)^ 
3. Based upon the Stipulation the court approved the 
proposed order and terminated Fauver's rights and obligations 
pursuant to the Stipulation. A copy of the Stipulation and 
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and "B". (R.8-10~) 
4. On or about November 14, 1988, the minor child 
filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County seeking support from Fauver. (R.93) 
5. Fauver filed a Motion for Change of Venue to the 
Eighth Judicial District Court of Uintah County because the 
previous Order of the court governed his parental rights and 
responsibilities. (R.107) 
6. The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Homer Wilkinson presiding, issued an Order transferring venue 
to the Eighth Judicial District Court. (R.91) 
7. Subsequent to the transfer Fauver filed a motion 
to add the mother, Patti Jill Hansen, as a party plaintiff. 
(R.161) 
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8. Patti Jill Hansea subsequently filed a petition to 
modify alleging that there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances. See paragraph 2 of Patti Jill Hansen's 
Complaint. (R.ll) 
9. The cases were consolidated upon stipulation. 
(R.20) 
10. Patti Jill Hansen filed a motion for temporary 
support (R.137-139) which was denied by the court (R.40) and 
the matter was set for hearing on March 7, 1989. 
11. The minor child filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the issues of temporary support and whether the 
order was void as a matter of law. (R.46-49) 
12. Fauver filed a motion to dismiss the minor 
child's complaint for failure to state a cause of action on 
the grounds that the child failed to allege a substantial 
change in circumstances since the previous order had been 
entered. (R.60) 
13. At hearing the parties argued their respective 
motions and the court issued its Ruling. (R.77-79) In the 
ruling the court denied the minor child's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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14. Counsel for the minor child subsequently filed an 
order of dismissal with the court which was signed on April 
10, 1989. (R.80-82) 
15. The minor child filed her Notice of Appeal on May 
1, 1989. (R.84-85) 
16^ The action by Patti Jill Hansen is still pending 
in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 9, 1986, Nellie Alexandra Hansen was born 
to Patti Jill Hansen. 
2. Carl Stuart Fauver is the natural father of the 
minor child. 
3. After discussions regarding marriage, Patti Jill 
Hansen and Carl Stuart Fauver entered into the stipulation 
regarding support, custody and visitation of the minor child. 
A copy of the stipulation is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that the minor child 
just first plead and prove that there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances before the court will modify a 
previous support order. By refusing to amend her complaint to 
allege change in circumstances the child failed to state a 
cause of action against defendant/respondent. 
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The fact that defendant is not required to pay support 
does not mean the order is void against Public Policy. In 
Woodard v. Woodard, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985 ) f the Utah Supreme 
Court approved of a divorce decree whereby the non-custodial 
parent was relieved of an. obligation to pay support and 
affirmed denial of a petition to modify because the custodial 
parent did not establish that there had been a substantial 
change in circumstances since the divorce. 
Public Policy requires that the burden of proof to 
modify a divorce or paternity action be the same standard 
regardless of whether the custodial parent, child, or 
Department of Social Services in the named plaintiff. Such a 
policy will lead to judicial efficiency and promote substance 
over form. If the court allows the child to modify the decree 
without proving substantial change in circumstances a guardian 
ad litem will be required in every action involving support in 
order to assure finality to the court's order. 
The plaintiff failed to raise the Equal Protection and 
Due Process arguments before the trial court and should be 
barred from raising them for the first time on appeal. If 
this court decides to consider these arguments, a review of 
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the record will demonstrate that the court made no distinction 
between plaintiff and any other child because of plaintiff's 
illegitimacy* Moreover plaintiff's due process argument is 
equally unsupported by any reference - to the record or case 
authority* Plaintiff's constitutional arguments are meritless 
and frivolous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE MINOR CHILD 
MUST PLEAD AND PROVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN ORDER TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO MODIFY 
A PATERNITY DECREE. 
The chief issue in this appeal is whether a child can 
petition to modify a support order that was entered into by 
stipulation of her parents which was approved by a court of 
competent jurisdiction without first pleading and establishing 
a substantial change in circumstances. The minor child and 
State of Utah as amicus curiae both frame the issue as whether 
the minor child has a cause of action against her father for 
support. Defendant/Respondent (hereinafter Fauver) agrees 
that minor children may sue their parents for support. This 
is not the issue before the court in this appeal. 
-6-
*• The standard <*r proof for modifying a previous 
support order should not differ based upon the named 
Plaintiff. 
rh* question is presented whether the -child is 
automatically entitled to modify the decree without 
establishing a change in circumstances. The District-Court in 
essence ruled that, assuming the order can be modified, it can 
only be modified after the party seeking modification first 
pleads and later proves that there has been a substantial and 
material change in circumstances. The Court would hold the 
child, mother or any other part* to the same Standard of 
Proof. In so ruling, the trial court followed previously 
established precedent of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
that a paternity or divorce decreed cannot be modified without 
first pleading and establishing that there has been a material 
and substantial 
change in circumstances since the entry of the child support 
decree. Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). 
See also Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 102 UAR 44, 47 
(Utah App. 1989) 
The substantial change in circumstances standard 
applies to modification of a divorce decree that relieves one 
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parent of the pbligation \ to * P^vij^e support. Wo.odard v. 
Woodard, 709 _P>2d_ 393 (Utah £985^. In Woodard, by Decree the 
father was awarded custody of the minor children and the 
mother was not ordered to pay the father any amount as child 
support. The father petitioned to modify the decree to. order 
the mother to pay support. The trial court failed to find a 
substantial change in circumstances since the divorce and 
denied the father's petition. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
holding that the father failed to establish a substantial 
change in circumstances and refused to modify the decree even 
though the non-custodial parent had no support obligation. As 
the Court stated: 
Both parents have an obligation to support their 
children . . . However, it does not necessarily 
follow that in every instance the non custodial 
parent must pay child support to the other 
parent. . . • The fact that one parent is not 
currently required to pay support to the other 
neither terminates the child's right or obviates 
the parents responsibility for such support as 
may be determined at some time in the future. 
Id. at 394. (emphasis added) 
The Court then concluded by holding that the plaintiff 
in Woodard failed to establish a substantial change in 
circumstances since the divorce to justify a modification and 
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as such allowed the non custodial parent to continue not 
paying any support whatsoever. Id. 
The minor child argues that U.C.A. §78-45-3 and 
§62a-ll-302 provide a separate duty of support in addition to 
that governed by a court decree and therefore the child need 
not plead and prove a substantial child in circumstances. 
This argument was addressed in the case of In re CJU, 660 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1983) As the Court in In re CJU stated: 
Parents are permanently "duty bound" to support 
their children under U.C.A. §78-45-3 and 4. 
However, the extent of that duty is not without 
limitation, particularly within the context of a 
marriage which has been dissolved by divorce 
decree. . . . Once the question of child 
support has been submitted to a court of 
competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon has 
been obtained, the more general statutory duty 
of support becomes circumscribed by the more 
specific duty imposed by the Court. A non 
custodial party whose obligation to provide 
support is being supervised by a court cannot be 
said to have any "duty" to provide support 
beyond that imposed by the Court. 
Id. at 239.(emphasis added) 
Thus the respondent's duty to support Nellie Alexandra 
Hansen has been governed by the Court order previously entered 
in this case. The only way that order can be modified is for 
either Patti Jill Hansen or Nellie Alexandra Hansen to prove 
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that there has been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances since the previous decree* 
B. Requiring the child to plead and prove a 
substantial change in circumstances is sound public policy. 
Public policy considerations support the conclusion 
that the child must first plead and prove substantial change 
in circumstances. 
The purpose behind requiring a substantial change in 
circumstances is to prevent the parties from relitigating 
issues previously decided by the Court. If a daughter is 
allowed to file a petition to modify a support decree with her 
mother's complicity and support, and the substantial change in 
circumstances standard no longer applies, parties will end up 
relitigating matters previously decided by the court on the 
grounds that "the child is not bound by the decree." The 
standard would require the appointment of a guardian ad litem 
in every paternity, divorce, adoption and modification case to 
come before the court. 
Moreover, many pre-child support guideline decrees may 
not provide sufficient support in terms of what was 
recommended by the guidelines. If the Court allows Nellie 
Alexandra Hansen to petition to modify the paternity decree 
without first establishing substantial change in 
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circumstances, this ploy will be used by every unhappy 
custodial parent to increase support to guideline levels. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this problem of 
several parties being able to petition for support in the case 
of -Mecham v. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). Mecham 
involved a divorce between the plaintiff and defendant whereby 
the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff $75 per month 
as child support for the parties1 minor child. Shortly after 
the divorce, plaintiff began receiving welfare payments. The 
Department then petitioned pursuant to §78-45-9 U.C.A. for 
reimbursement of amounts provided as support. The Court held 
that the Department's rights were governed by the divorce 
decree and its rights to reimbursement were only derivative of 
the mother's. Therefore the Department was only entitled to 
that support that was provided in the decree. 
Although not spelled out specifically in this case, 
the rationale was clearly that the Department should not be 
allowed to modify a previous divorce decree without first 
establishing substantial change in circumstances. la this 
case, the child, like the Department, has the right to 
petition for support. The support is governed by the previous 
paternity decree. The only way the child or the Department or 
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any other interested party could petition for increased 
support would be to modify the previous paternity decree only 
after a showing of substantial change in circumstances. 
Such a policy will lend continuity and stability to 
the judicial process by requiring anyone, including parent, 
child or Department of Social Services to plead and prove a 
substantial change in circumstances in order to modify a 
previous court order. The outcome of a petition to modify 
will not be dependent upon who is named as plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER AN ORDER 
THAT RELIEVED DEFENDANT OF HIS OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE CHILD 
BASED UPON THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES. 
The trial court had jurisdiction to determine 
defendant's support requirements pursuant to §78-45a-5 and the 
amicus curiae's argument that it lacked jurisdiction is 
without merit. 
This action was commenced by defendant respondent 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity, §78-45a-l et seq., for a 
determination of his responsibilities and obligations 
regarding the child. 
Specifically §78-45a-5(1) provides: 
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The District Court has jurisdiction of an action 
under this act, . . . The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for 
future education and necessary support. 
Moreover, §78-45a-13 provides "an agreement of 
settlement with the alleged father is binding only when 
approved by the Court,11 
In this case the parents reached a settlement that was 
approved by the court. The settlement contemplated that the 
defendant would consent to adoption, waive visitation, and not 
challenge for custody of the child then or at any time in the 
future. in exchange the mother agreed to use her own 
resources to raise the child. The court approved the 
stipulation. 
The child and the State now claim that the court did 
not have jurisdiction and the order is void because the order 
did not require defendant to pay support. 
In In re CJU and Woodard, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically recognized the discretion of courts to 
approve stipulations whereby one parent waives support from 
the other. This waiver of support is precisely what occurred 
in this case which the court has approved. The fact that the 
child has not in fact been adopted does not render the order 
void nor does it violate public policy. Plaintiff's remedy is 
to seek modification by alleging and proving that there has 
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been a substantial change in circumstances since the paternity 
decree had entered* 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE MINOR CHILD'S 
EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
A. Plaintiff failed to raise any constitutional 
issues before the trial court and should be barred from 
raising these issues for the first time on appeal. 
It has long been recognized that absent exceptional 
circumstances, this Court will not entertain a claim raised 
for the first time on appeal. Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17, 19 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1131 (Utah 1987) . 
In this case the record is devoid of any 
constitutional claim by the minor child as to whether the 1986 
order denied the child equal protection or due process of 
law. Because it was not raised below, it cannot now be 
challenged on appeal. 
B. The trial court did not deny plaintiff equal 
protection of the law. 
Plaintiff and amicus curiae go to great lengths in 
their briefs to establish that the trial court refused to set 
aside the previous order because plaintiff is illegitimate. 
In so doing the plaintiff cites Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 
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536-37 (1973 ) which held that a state may not deny support to 
children based solely on illegitimacy. 
*The record clearly reflects that the court made no 
distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy. The court 
ruled on Fauverfs motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed 
to allege a substantial and material change in circumstances. 
This standard applies to modifying divorce and paternity 
decrees. No where did the Court state, or even imply that it 
was basing the decision to require an allegation of change in 
circumstance on the fact that plaintiff was illegitimate. 
The court in fact cross referenced to divorce and 
paternity modifications in its ruling. The court's' chief 
concern in allowing a child to modify a court order without 
proving substantial change in circumstances is that it would 
require the appointment of a guardian ad litem in practically 
every divorce, paternity and adoption case. The appellant's 
attempt to place this case in the posture of legitimate versus 
non legitimate children is not supported by any citation to 
the record and, in fact, is wholly unsupported by record. The 
trial court treated plaintiff the same way it would treat any 
child petitioning to modify its parent's support obligation 
irregardless of the child's legitimacy. 
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C. The trial court did not deny plaintiff due process 
of law. 
Plaintiff argues that the 1986 court denied plaintiff 
her procedural due process by failing to appoint counsel for 
her prior to terminating defendant's support obligation. 
Again# this issue is raised for the first time on appeal. 
Even if the court wishes to consider this issue at 
this time, this Court will find that plaintiff did not violate 
defendant's procedural due process rights. Plaintiff and 
amicus cite no case to this court where the constitution 
mandates the appointment of counsel for children in support 
actions. The parties, the child's mother and father, felt it 
was in the best interests of the child to have the mother and 
her family assume full custodial responsibility for the 
children. Plaintiff now seeks to establish a new heretofore 
unrecognized right to appointed counsel for children in 
paternity and divorce actions. Without supporting the claim, 
plaintiff states that "clearly interests of the mother were at 
odds with those of the plaintiff." Those interests were not 
at odds because the child has been well taken care of by the 
mother and her family. Moreover, the mother is an active 
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participant in this litigation by filing a companion 
modifications action and by answering interrogatories on 
behalf of plaintiff. 
The child's interests do not require appointed counsel 
and the court, therefore, did not violate plaintiff's due 
process rights when it failed to appoint a guardian ^ d litem. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Respondent respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the Order of Dismissal. 
DATED this _/3j? day of October, 1989. 
HARkY H/ SOUVALL' 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Respondent 
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L. A- DEVER, #0875 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
OCT 2 1 9 8 6 
DUrtUln* LUCK. CLfcRK 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, 
Petitioner, 
vs . 
PATTI JILL HANSEN, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No.^^t/^^V-^ 
Carlisle Stuart Fauver, the petitioner, and Patti 
Jill Hansen, the respondent, having duly considered what is in 
the best interests of Nellie Alexandra Hansen, the minor child 
of the parties, and desiring to create a healthy environment 
in which the minor child can grow, hereby stipulate and agree 
as follows: 
1. Carlisle Stuart Fauver and Patti Jill Hansen are 
the natural parents of the minor child, Nellie Alexandra 
Hansen (hereafter referred to as "Alex", born July 9, 1986). 
2. Permanent custody of the child shall be granted 
to the respondent. Petitioner agrees that any claims to 
custody by him or anyone claiming through him are forever 
waived. 
ESdnibi+ A 
3. The petitioner forfeits all legal rights to the 
child, and makes no claims as parent for any purpose included 
but not limited to an income tax deduction. 
4. The petitioner agrees to make no demands to spend 
time with the child. The parties agree this does not forbid 
interaction between father and daughter, but any such 
interaction requires complete approval from the mother. 
5. In the event of the death of respondent, custody 
of the child shall be transferred to the party designated by 
respondent, or to the maternal grandparents if no designation 
has been made. Petitioner waives any right to challenge said 
transfer of custody. 
6. The petitioner shall not be held legally or 
financially responsible for the minor child and the respondent 
agrees to waive all future child support payments or any other 
form of support from petitioner. 
7. The petitioner agrees that contemporeanously with 
this Stipulation, he will execute in open Court a consent to 
adoption and waiver of parental rights. Said consent will 
provide that petitioner will not object to the adoption of 
said minor child and that the respondent has no obligation to 
inform petitioner of said adoption. 
8. At his discretion, petitioner may establish a 
financial arrangement he feels is appropriate to insure some 
measure of future financial security for the minor child. 
2-
9. Any and all obligations between petitioner and 
respondent that may have arisen as a result of the birth of 
the minor child that have not been resolved by this agreement 
shall be terminated. 
DATED this i^ day of September, 1986. 
rx/X^ J>LMJ~ ^ A J A K ^ V - rju'tti 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER' PATTI JILL HANSE1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN before me this /? day of 
September, 1986. 
^ yl* ///*.[(/ ...' dit* *"-l 
NOTARY PUSLIC 
My commission exp ires : Residing at:*fL^ c?<- ~^s<c[/y 
c <
 f 
sy /,/ < " ^ 
L. A. DEVER, #0875 
McRAE & DeLANO 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
FILED 
•^STRICT COURT 
OCT 2 1986 
OUHUtHY LUCK, CL£RK 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PATTI JILL HANSEN, 
Defendant* 
O R D E R 
Civil No. ¥60/35^ 
The above entitled action came on regularly for 
hearing this 2d day of October, 1986, before the Honorable 
Richard C. Davidson. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by counsel, L. A. Dever. Defendant did not appear 
in person or through counsel. A Stipulation entered into 
between the parties was presented to the Court. The Court 
having approved said stipulation and having heard testimony of 
petitioner, and petitioner having signed in open Court a 
Consent to Termination of Parental Rights, and being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Carlisle Stuart Fauver and Patti Jill Hansen are 
the natural parents of the minor child, Nellie Alexandra 
Hansen, born July 9, 1986. 
ExYiibii 6 
2. Permanent custody of said minor child is hereby 
awarded to Patti Jill Hansen. Any claims to custody by 
petitioner or anyone claiming through him are forever waived. 
3. Petitioner forfeits all legal rights to the 
child, and makes no claim as parent for any purpose including, 
but not limited to, an income tax deduction. 
4. Petitioner is ordered to make no demands to spend 
time with the child. Any interaction between father and 
daughter must be upon the complete approval of defendant. 
5. In the event of the death of respondent, custody 
of the child is ordered to be transferred to the party 
designated by respondent, or to the maternal grandparents if 
no designation has been made. Petitioner waives any right to 
challenge said transfer of custody. 
6. Petitioner shall not be held legally or 
financially responsible for the minor child and the respondent 
waives all future child support payments or any other form of 
support from petitioner. 
7. Petitioner may, at his discretion, establish a 
financial arrangement he feels is appropriate to insure some 
measure of future financial security for the minor child. 
8. Petitioner hereby forever waives and disclaims 
any right accuring under the parent-child relationship between 
him and said minor child. 
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9. Petitioner hereby waives any notice or service 
upon him of any petition for adoption involving Nellie 
Alexandra Hansen and said adoption may be granted without his 
participation. 
10. Any and all obligations between petitioner and 
respondent that may have arisen as a result of the birth of 
the minor child that have not been resolved are hereby 
terminated. 
DATED this fl?^ day of October, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
-3-
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-l 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses C.J.S. — 97 C.J.S. Witnesses $ 266 et seq. 
i 148 et seq. Key Numbers. — Witnesses *» 187 et seq. 
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently exist-
ing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution to any 
other rights. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 12. 
78-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14. Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Meaning of "this act". — See note under utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68. 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section 
78-45a-l. 
78-45«-2. 
78-45a-3. 
78-45a-4. 
78-45a-5. 
78-45a-6. 
78*45a-7, 
78-45a-8. 
Obligations of the father. 
Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the 
father. 
Limitations on recovery from fa-
ther's estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Authority for blood tests. 
Selection of experts. 
Section 
78-45a-9. 
78-45a-10. 
78-45a-ll. 
78-45a-12. 
78-45a-13. 
78-45a-14. 
78-45a-15. 
78-45a-16. 
78-45a-17. 
Compensation of expert witnesses. 
Effect of test results. 
Judgment. 
Security. 
Settlement agreements. 
Venue. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
The father of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable to the 
same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child 
is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and con-
finement and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the 
child. A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by 
a man other than her husband. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1. Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
Cross-References.— Public support of chil- § 78-45-1 et seq. 
dren, Chapter 45b of this title. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, 5 77-31-1 et seq. 
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78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to 
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3. for support or maintenance of dependent chil-
Cross-References. — Limitation of action dren, § 78-12-22. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statute of limitations. for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during 
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of 
„J™ n*'
 x A A ,. ... ., .. . . . . child support is still limited by this section. 
While any statute limiting the time within
 S z a r a k y S a n d o v a l j 6 3 6 R 2 d 1 0 8 2 (Utah 
which a paternity action must be commenced IQQI) 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
§ 127. 35. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are 
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be pay-
able for dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4. 1965, Chapter 158, which appears as 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this §§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-17 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws Cross-References. — Civil liability for sup-
port, Chapter 45 of this title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children *=» 
§ 127. 35. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J S. Bastards § 53. 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all 
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and 
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses 
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All reme-
dies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available 
for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
state Department of Social Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in 
its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to enforce 
that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department, 
all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable to this 
chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Department of 
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Social Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county 
attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that depart-
ment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, last sentence in Subsection (1), appears as 
{ 24. Chapter 31 of Title 77. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note under Cross-Reference*. — Creation of Depart-
same catchline following § 78-45a-4. ment of Social Services, § 63-35-3. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1. 
Support Act — The Uniform Reciprocal En- General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1. 
forcement of Support Act, referred to in the
 t Gene™* jurisdiction of district court, 
§ 78-3-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jurisdiction. form Act on Paternity, when the putative fa-
#A_ . . A. - ,, ther is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't 
-Minor i ty of putative father.
 o f g ^ ^ ^ y D i c k ^ R M 4 2 ^ 
District court, and not the juvenile court, has 1904^ 
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uni-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
§ 126 et seq. 69 to 71. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 116, 117. 
78-45a-6. Time of trial. 
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy 
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be 
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may 
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 6. 
Cross-References. — Depositions before ac-
tion, Rule 27, U.R.C.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *» 
§ 123. 55. 
C.J.S. — 10 CJ.S. Bastards § 101. 
78-45a-7. Authority for blood tests. 
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf 
of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the 
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order 
the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party 
refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity 
against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests 
of justice so require. 
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78-45a-13. Settlement agreements. 
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when 
approved by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, 5 13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *=» 
§ 98 et seq. 33. 
C.J.S. — 10 CJ.S. Bastards § 40 et seq. 
78-45a-14. Venue. 
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged 
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14. Cross-References. — Venue, general provi-
Meaning of "this act". — See note under sions, Chapter 13 of this title, 
same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=» 
§ 76. 37. 
C.J.S. — 10 C J.S Bastards §§ 57, 58. 
78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15. Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68. 
"[tjhis act," referred to in this section, see note 
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
78-45a-16. Short title-
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Act on Pater-
nity." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, $ 16. w[t]his act,* referred to in this section, see note 
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of under same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
78-45a-17. Operation of act 
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act 
where birth occurs after this act takes effect. 
History: L- 1965, ch. 158, § 17. see note under same catchline following 
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of § 78-45a-4. 
"[tjhis act," referred to throughout this section, "This act takes effect". The term "this act 
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78-45-3. Duty of man. 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support his wife when she is 
in need. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 3; 1977, ch. 
140, § 3. 
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport 
of children, § 76-7-201. 
ANALYSIS 
Child's right to support. 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
—Retarded child. 
—Transfer. 
Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Estoppel to assert duty to support. 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
Child's right to support 
A child's right to support is his own right, 
not his parent's. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 
P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
Parents are permanently "duty-bound" to 
support their children; however, the extent of 
that duty is not without limitation, and where 
the question of child support has been submit-
ted to a court of competent jurisdiction and a 
ruling thereon has been obtained, the more 
general statutory duty of support becomes cir-
cumscribed by the more specific duty imposed 
by the court. In re C J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1983). 
—Retarded child. 
Trial court properly required husband to pay 
child support after the child reached 21 years 
of age where the child was retarded and inca-
pable of self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 615 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1980). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid himself of his duty to 
support his children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Divorce terminates husband's duty to sup-
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
port his wife except for any obligations im-
posed by the divorce decree. Gulley v. Gulley, 
570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Estoppel to assert duty to support 
Children have a right to support, but where 
their mother and her second husband had pro-
vided it, mother was estopped to demand that 
her first husband also contribute support; since 
her demand was not in the nature of a claim 
for reimbursement, to grant it would have been 
in effect to give the children "double support" 
to which they were not entitled. Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
District court erred in deducting proceeds of 
medical and burial insurance policy from 
amount of special damages in action by father 
for wrongful death of son, since father was un-
der legal duty imposed by statute to pay cost of 
medical care and burial expenses for son and 
was thus entitled to recover amounts reason-
ably expended for that purpose; mere fact that 
plaintiff at own expense carried insurance to 
protect against such contingencies should not 
inure to benefit of wrongdoer. Ottley v. Hill, 21 
Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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oi mat expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modifi-
cation of the child support order. 
(2) Unless the expenses described in Subsection (1) are included in the child 
support order, or the parents enter into a written agreement to share the 
expenses, one parent may not obligate both parents to pay the expenses. 
History: C. 1963,78-46-7.16, enacted by L. became effective cm April 24,1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, I 1& Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
H 
78-45-7.17. Chad care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is pre-
sumed if the custodial parent is working and actually incurring the child care 
costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be 
awarded on a case by case basis if the costs are related to the career or 
occupational training of the custodial parent. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L. became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, | 19. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered. 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be 
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table or for the 
award of uninsured extraordinary medical expenses except under Subsection 
(2). 
(2) If the combination of the two amounts under Subsection (1) exceeds 50% 
of the obligor's adjusted gross income, or that by adding the child care costs, 
the total child support award would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross 
income, the presumption under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted. 
History: C. 1963, 7S-45-7.18, enacted by L. became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, * 20. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and 
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable 
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Social Services or any other 
department or agency of this state that provides public assistance, as 
defined by Subsection 62A-11-303(3), to enforce the right to recover public 
assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of 
support against the obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the 
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the 
obligee to represent the office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to estab-
lish or modify a support obligation or to recover support due or owing, 
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Action for reimburse 
—Collateral estoppel 
—Costs. 
Custody rights. 
—Paternity. 
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ft c. 19W, ©A-1M11, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 408 
eh. 1, I 906. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
PART 3 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
-11-301. Short title. 
This part shall be known as the "Public Support of Children Act." 
gjktory: C. 1963, 62A-11-301, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, | 408 
f» 1988, ch. 1, f 286. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
62A-11-302. Common-law and statutory remedies 
augmented by act — Public policy. 
. The state of Utah, exercising its police and sovereign power, declares that 
the common-law and statutory remedies pertaining to family desertion and 
nonsupport of minor dependent children shall be augmented by this part, 
which is directed to the real and personal property resources of the responsible 
parents. In order to render resources more immediately available to meet the 
needs of minor children, it is the legislative intent that the remedies provided 
in this part are in addition to, and not in lieu of, existing law. It is declared to 
be the public policy of this state that this part be liberally construed and 
administered to the end that children shall be maintained from the resources 
of responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the 
burden often borne by the general citizenry through public assistance pro-
grams. 
History: C. 1963, 82A-11-302, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1968, ch. 1,1 408 
L. 1968, ch. 1, | 387. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988. 
62A-11-303- Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Assistance" or "public assistance" means assistance for Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, and public funds expended for the 
reasonable and necessary health and dental care of a dependent child, 
and public resources used for the benefit of a person, whether specified as 
financial aid, services, or otherwise. 
(2) "Court order" means any judgment or order of any district court of 
this state or of any court of comparable jurisdiction of another state that 
orders payment of a set or determinable amount of support 
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